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Wilson, Mark R. The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the
State, 1861-1865. The Johns Hopkins University Press, $45.00 cloth ISBN
801883422
The Economics of the Civil War
Mobilizing Soldiers and the Homefront
It seems hard to believe there is anything left to say about the Civil War that
has not already been stated and restated, chewed and digested, and finally spat
out for consideration by those interested in the most cataclysmic period in
American history. By my reckoning, there is at least one book about the Civil
War published each day. And yet here, Mark R. Wilson says something new and
vital about the war by illustrating the role of war and the military in American
business and politics.
Nothing like this has ever been published. In a clearly written and
informative fashion, the author examines the North's wartime economic
mobilization within the political, cultural, and democratic forces that shaped it.
The process of making contracts for war material is the central theme of the book
as portrayed in the ongoing clash between the new creation of large-scale
businesses and manufacturing and Thomas Jefferson's outmoded concept of the
sole proprietor and individual farmer.
In his Proclamation of April 15, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln called for
75,000 volunteers for three months, without Congressional approval. As a basis
for the new army, every northern state had a volunteer militia force, of which
none were well-officered, supplied, or drilled. Company officers were elected by
the men, while regimental and general officers were appointed by the state
governor. When the regiment was reasonably complete and at least partially
equipped, it was forwarded to a training camp and placed under federal control.
These regiments had to be supplied. As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
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Navy, Lincoln called for the enlistments, appropriated money for the purchase of
arms and munitions, again without Congress's approval. Many Confederates
believed that northern industry would collapse when cut off from its southern
markets and its supply of cotton. However, just the opposite happened. Northern
merchants and industry grew fat during the war. War demands stimulated
production: for example, in Philadelphia alone 180 new factories were built
during the years 1862-64. Generous government contracts and lavish
expenditures helped to create a new aristocracy of profiteers, who became
masters of capital after the war. Paper money and a high protective tariff that
Congress imposed as a counterweight to internal taxation brought a sharp rise in
prices, which the government made no effort to control.
The needs of supplying vast armies were great. As Wilson points out on the
first page: In four years, the Union supplied its soldiers with roughly one billion
rounds of small arms ammunition, one million horses and mules, 1.5 million
barrels of pork and 100 million pounds of coffee, six million woolen blankets,
and ten million pairs of trousers. Given such figures, it is not difficult to
conclude that the million-man Northern army was, as one scholar has put it, the
largest, best equipped, best fed, and most powerful war machine ever assembled
in the history of the world to that date.'
Business and manufacturing became the behemoths of the economy, causing
controversies. Greed and temptation led to jurisdiction of contractors being
placed under military law, as well as prosecution of several by courts martial for
attempts to defraud the government. As Wilson describes it, more profound than
a series of complaints against individual criminal acts, Northerners' campaign
against middlemen raised difficult questions about the legitimacy of commercial
profit taken during a national emergency (149).
The initial chapter, quite naturally, describes mobilization for war and how
little prepared the North was in providing for Abraham Lincoln's initial call for
75,000 troops up from a peacetime army of 16,000. The Lincoln administration
initially looked to the states, as it did for troops, to acquire supplies as well as
manage the wartime economy that flowed therefrom, until it was assumed by the
United States government.
As the responsibility and jurisdiction fell on the federal government, the
author describes the officers within the Quartermaster's Department who had the
ultimate responsibility in determining the success or failure of this part of the
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war effort. By describing the problems they faced, Wilson provides the
backgrounds of the members of the Quartermaster's Department that did so much
to maintain a level playing field. A first-hand view of the evolution of the
Quartermaster's Department prior to 1860 under the attenuated tenure of Thomas
S. Jesup is given. The men who ran the North's war economy were shaped by the
logistical challenges associated with managing the army's operations prior to the
war.
An excellent discussion follows about the efforts to balance government and
private enterprise. Debates concerned maximizing efficiency while trying to
equitably distribute contracts; government manufacturing; and the employment
they provided communities struggling with the loss of manpower to the military.
By the book's end, it becomes apparent that notwithstanding the
demobilization of the North's military economy after Appomattox, the
methodology used for wartime mobilization became the rule in transforming the
nation in the decades after the war. While the Civil War reader follows the
movements of armies and decisions of generals, it is refreshing to see an
examination of what made the Northern armies operate and function.
If Wilson's book feels unlike most Civil War books and sounds contrary to
the usual military rhetoric, it is not because it affirms that war is hell. There is
never any doubt in this book that the country needed to fight this war and that it
was necessary; but it is the cost of such necessity that defines The Business of
Civil War.
Frank J. Williams is Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and
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Proclamation: Three Views û Political, Social, and Pictorial, which he wrote with
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University Press in April 2006. He is a member of the U.S. Abraham Lincoln
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